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I. Introduction
Heidegger determines the average everydayness of his concept
of Dasein as follows: “entangled-disclosed, thrown-projecting
being in the world, which is concerned with its ownmost
potentiality in its being together with the “world” and beingwith with others” (175). In simpler terms, this means that as
human beings, we are primarily concerned with living up to
our own potentiality given the possibilities accessible to us, and
we seek to do so in solidarity with the world and the people
around us. Heidegger thus describes the necessity for us to
reach our true potentiality to live a good life, but does not give
us a clear account of how to achieve this.
In this paper I will deduce a practical account of a life well
lived in which we achieve our ownmost potentiality from
Heidegger’s ontology. I argue that under a Heideggerian
ontological view, a life well lived is a life completed, in which
there is authentic being-towards-death marked by peace with
the prospect of death. Authentic being-towards-death can be
achieved through the sufficient fulfillment of one’s ownmost
aspirations. These aspirations can be fulfilled by taking an
active and resolute stance within one’s existential possibilities,
thus giving us an account of a practical and attainable theory of
a life well lived.
First, I will define and interpret some crucial Heideggerian
terms I will be using throughout the paper. Then, I will lay
out the relevant parts of Heidegger’s ontology, which will
form the foundation for my argument. In particular, I will
begin by explaining where Dasein initially finds itself in
the world, and how it relates to itself and others. I will then
explain how this state of Dasein shows us what Dasein needs
to act on to live well. Then, I will outline Dasein’s relationship
with death and anxiety, and how peace with the prospect
of death is necessary for completion. Then, I will elaborate
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on what I mean by fulfilling aspirations, as well as how it
relates to authenticity. Heidegger’s notion of authenticity
will be central to my argument, precisely because Heidegger
intended for authenticity to be value-neutral, and previous
notions of a “good life” have often been entangled in moral
judgements, such as Aristotle’s concept of human flourishing as
Eudaimonia, which requires being a virtuous person. Instead,
authenticity and completion are value-neutral. Next, I will give
my account of completion and how it can be attained. Lastly,
I will briefly consider plausible objections to my argument as
well as some practical implications of my argument for the field
of ethics.
II. Defining Terms
Heidegger’s philosophy relies inherently on his use of the
German language, and as such English interpretations of
his word choices vary. I will thus explain why I opt to use
the original German for some of his terms in lieu of English
translations, and the particular interpretations of these terms I
will adhere to. Before I briefly do this, I will give the relevant
interpretation of Dasein; a core concept of this paper and
Heidegger’s work and one that has been left almost universally
untranslated to maintain its meaning.
There exists significant debate as to how the entity that Dasein
designates should be understood, but for my argument the
most important component of Dasein is the description it gives
us of human persons and their activity in the world. Thus, I
will use Haugeland’s interpretation of Dasein (as reiterated
by Rouse) as my working definition: Dasein is a way of living
that embodies an understanding of being (Wrathall 206). The
components that are most relevant to my argument are as
follows: Dasein’s essence lies in its existence, meaning that its
own existence is of crucial concern to it; it is inherent to Dasein
to always be concerned with its own being (Heidegger 41, 185).
Furthermore, Dasein always defines and understands itself in
terms of the possibilities that it is (Heidegger, 44).
As stated, I will utilize some of Heidegger’s original German
terms in cases where there exist significant differences between
scholars on what terms to use. Most notably are Befindlichkeit
and das Man. Befindlichkeit, typically translated as state of
mind, affectedness, or disposedness, is the term Heidegger
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uses to describe where Dasein finds itself in the world. It is
closely related to the concept of being-in-the-world, which
denotes Dasein’s existence as inherently and inseparably being
part of the world and its environment. Befindlichkeit will be
explored more in-depth in section VI, and since there is a lack
of scholarly consensus regarding its most accurate translation, I
will opt to use the original German throughout this paper.
Das Man has been translated as “the They,” “the anyone” and
“the One.” Dreyfus gives a compelling argument for using “the
One,” as Heidegger’s original concept was not meant to only
denote “the other,” but rather social norms: “one pays one’s
taxes (Dreyfus 158). On the other hand, “the They” is often used
to emphasize the external societal pressures and norms that are
being put on Dasein and Dasein’s potential to become lost in
“the They.” Both translations are criticized for failing to capture
the full meaning of das Man, which Heidegger intended to
denote an abstract conceptualization of humanity’s social
reality that Dasein itself is also part of. Throughout this paper,
I will thus opt to use the original German das Man. There will
be a handful of other Heideggerian terms throughout the paper,
but their definitions are less complex and will thus be defined
when relevant.
III. Being-in-the-World: Befindlichkeit and das Man
I will now give the relevant aspects of Heidegger’s being-in-theworld and its relationship with das Man to illustrate the initial
state of Dasein from which it must act out its life. According
to Heidegger, the most basic level of the world in which we
carry out our lives is fundamentally a meaning-filled context,
and everything in it exists in reciprocal interdependence to
us (Guignon & Pereboom 192-195). Each individual person’s
life is made their own by where they find themselves, their
Befindlichkeit. We are thrown into a pre-existing environment
that is filled with possibilities. In Befindlichkeit, Dasein finds
itself confronted with its current, future, and past possibilities;
it reveals what situation we were thrown into (Heidegger 238). I
argue that we as human beings receive our sufficient conditions
for completion from this nexus of possibilities. This nexus of
possibilities is anxiety inducing. Dreyfus explains this sort of
anxiety in Befindlichkeit as the idea that “social action now
appears as a game which there is no point in playing since it
has no intrinsic meaning” (180). The “meaning of life” might
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almost seem like an illusionary conspiracy made up by society
if Dasein loses itself in das Man. In order to feel complete,
Dasein needs to authentically project itself towards some
sort of social action or role that Dasein cares about and thus
experiences as meaningful. If Dasein’s social actions and roles
seem meaningless and pointless, Dasein will not feel complete.
Dasein’s anxiety can thus be dissipated by searching within the
existential - practically attainable - possibilities to find those
towards which Dasein is authentically projected.
With this basic ontology of Dasein’s initial existence, we can
begin to examine what Dasein needs to find fulfillment before
we identify a path to achieve said fulfillment. I am using
“fulfillment” here as a measure for completion, as the average
person will often describe having lived a life well lived as
having lived a fulfilling life. As stated earlier, one of the core
characteristics of Dasein is that it cares about its own being.
Dasein is also characterized by the need to do and undertake
practical actions. I thus deduce that Dasein needs to engage
in activity projected towards something it cares about to feel
fulfilled. I will henceforth refer to what Dasein cares about and
seeks to engage in projected activity towards as aspirations, for
the sake of brevity.
To understand how Dasein can find its aspirations among
the existential possibilities, we first need to take a look at
Heidegger’s concept of the self. Heidegger’s definition of the
self (or selfhood) is different from many traditional conceptions
of the self (e.g. as psychological identity). Wrathall states that
for Heidegger, the self is a disclosive function that an individual
acts out (66). This particular individual has “specific projects,
dispositions, skills, and practices” that determine how the
world shows up for them and how they act in response: we
are thus continuously influenced by das Man, and rarely our
ownmost self (Wrathall 66). For most people, it will thus be
difficult to find one’s self within society. Dasein’s self as a
particular is often dispersed, and sometimes lost, in das Man
(Heidegger 258). Dasein typically primarily understands itself
in terms of norms that were decided by das Man (Wrathall 643).
Das Man maintains itself in its everydayness by remaining in
the ontic, factical realm, and only concerns itself with beings as
objects, rather than ways of beings, staying within preconceived
boundaries of social norms. Regardless, it is impossible to exist
completely separate from das Man due to the nature of Dasein
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as being-in-the-world. It is thus crucial that Dasein finds itself
within das Man. Dasein will derive a significant amount of its
roles and interpretations of what it means to be human from
das Man (Dreyfus 158), but to truly feel complete, I argue that
Dasein must find among these roles the role that is grounded
in authenticity and the self, rather than only in das Man. This
requires that Dasein is shown to itself in its possible authenticity
while it is lost in das Man (Heidegger 258). As stated earlier,
the self is a disclosive function, and if the self is a disclosive
function, then it is pivotal in disclosing aspirations among the
existential possibilities.
IV. Being-towards-Death and Anxiety
If this disclosure lies in the self, but the self is also inseparably
tied up in das Man, then we must show the self can nonetheless
disclose its ownmost aspirations. The key to this lies in anxiety.
As stated in the previous section, anxiety arises when we are
confronted by the vast amount of possibilities. In Heidegger’s
analysis of anxiety, we learn that anxiety reminds us that our
time is limited for our lives are finite, and we are ultimately
responsible for our actions and thus in control of our own
potentiality-for-being. Anxiety makes us aware that we have
this responsibility to shape our own life before we are faced
with death. Anxiety confronts Dasein with its freedom for
authenticity of its being as a possibility. In doing so, anxiety
shows Dasein its conditions for authenticity: it makes one aware
of how one is (Heidegger 182). The conditions of authenticity
will be explored further in a later section.
We must thus first carefully lay out the role of death before we
can get into the functional use of anxiety. Heidegger states that
“death signifies a peculiar possibility-of-Being in which the
very Being of one’s own Dasein is an issue. In dying, it is shown
that mineness and existence are ontologically constitutive for
death” (Heidegger 247). In other words, Death is the moment in
which our existence becomes finalized, and in this finalization,
our own being and our own life becomes an issue for ourselves.
We are always aware of the impending nature of death. We
are always being-toward-death, and this reveals to us our
own potentiality-for-being. In death, Dasein is manifested as
everything it ever was, is, and ever will be. Heidegger gives us
a succinct definition of the ontological concept of death to keep
in mind as we wrestle with its role: “as the end of Dasein, death
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is the ownmost, non relational, certain, and, as such indefinite
and insuperable possibility of Dasein” (248). Death is inevitable
and yet unique to every individual. It sums up Dasein’s life in
its totality, and as such death is Dasein’s ownmost possibility.
It is important to note that by death, Heidegger does not
simply mean physical and biological death. Thomson points
out Heidegger’s distinction between “demise” and “death”
by explaining that demise is the ordinary physical death and
complete annihilation of experience that we typically think of,
and that death is the existential phenomenon that implicitly
shapes our experiences with demise (Wrathall 218). It is death
as this existential phenomenon that gives us this anxiety, for
it marks our eventual inability to change anything about our
existence.
The mindset of a person who has not had a life well lived but
faces death is laid out by the character Inez in Jean-Paul Sartre’s
play No Exit: “One always dies too soon- or too late. And yet
one’s whole life is complete at that moment, with a line drawn
neatly under it, ready for the summing up. You are- your life,
and nothing else” (Sartre 24) Whether peace with the prospect
of death is present or not, one recognizes that life is complete
when death occurs, in the sense that it has ended and nothing
can be added to it. It is completed in the sense that it has been
finalized: concluded and exhausted. However, completion as I
use the term throughout this paper entails a certain satisfaction
and peace. Completion is something that can be achieved before
death, that entails that there is nothing left one aspires to be or
have.
To further understand this, and to play into Heidegger’s
emphasis on everydayness, we can examine an analogy. There
is a more everyday manifestation of anxiety similar to that
which we have towards death. Take the dynamic between
wake and sleep. At the end of a day well lived, it is often easy
to go to sleep. At the end of a day not well lived, the prospect
of ending the day by sleeping is often filled with anxiety. You
might consider the day wasted, and feel anxious that you
did not do or be everything you aspired to do or be with the
time allotted to you in the day. This is akin to the anxiety we
feel in being-towards-death. The key difference between this
everyday manifestation of anxiety and its total manifestation
is final, barring concepts of reincarnation, there is no more
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time that comes afterwards that matters for the totality of one’s
life. The anxiety surrounding death is thus much greater than
that surrounding sleep, but they are of a similar kind. Anxiety
also entails feelings of unsettledness that mark that there is
something missing or disturbed, detaching Dasein from its
own being-in-the-world, which is integral to its very being.
The perseverance of this anxiety until the point of death is an
obstacle to Dasein’s ability to live a life completed. However,
anxiety is first necessary to identify what matters most to
Dasein. Anxiety causes a breakdown that reveals to Dasein its
own nature and that of the world around it. It thus reveals that
Dasein has no control over what already is, thereby revealing
that Dasein is dependent on a pre-existing public environment
that it had no hand in producing (Dreyfus 177). Nonetheless,
it must find in this pre-existing environment those existential
possibilities that it can make its own. By accepting anxiety,
Dasein can respond to the situation it finds itself in.
I argue that by accepting and responding to this anxiety in
being-towards-death that Heidegger describes, Dasein will be
able to project itself to what matters to it; its aspirations. When
Dasein does this, anxiety will diminish and completion in the
absence of unfilled aspirations and thus peace with the prospect
of death can be achieved. This is also what differentiates
peace with the prospect of death from a death wish or suicidal
idealization. When life feels complete, we are filled with a sense
of peace and tranquility. When we wish to die or have suicidal
ideations, we are instead filled with anxiety, hopelessness, or
emptiness. The anxiety that has been present throughout life is
still there in suicidal idealization, but diminishes in peace with
the prospect of death. To find this peace then, we must examine
what fulfills Dasein. Inherent to Dasein is that it cares about its
own being and will project itself towards what matters to it.
Without something that matters to it and that it can act towards,
Dasein is reduced to a passive, antithetical version of itself.
V. Authenticity and Aspirations
In section II I noted that Dasein seeks to undertake projected
activity towards that which it cares about: that what Dasein
cares about through projected activity I refer to as aspirations.
I also briefly noted in section IV that anxiety reveals to us
our aspirations, and I will now give a more complete account
of what constitutes our authentic aspirations and how we
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go about acting to fulfill them. As human beings, we throw
ourselves into social roles that reflect what matters to us: “In
throwing myself into the life of a scholar or a brewer, I respond
to what matters, what is significant or important, in this way of
life. Dasein’s being matters to it, and so it is called by its being
to its being” (Wrathall 206, 138). Our aspirations are thus often
tied to social roles and projects we seek to fulfill because we
care about them in our being. It is important to differentiate
these aspirations from social roles or projects we seek to fulfill
for some external reward: such as social expectations rooted
in das Man, or financial prospect. Through this differentiation,
we can also identify what our ownmost authentic aspirations
are. Our authentic aspirations are those that do not come solely
from das Man.
Before I give an account of authentic aspirations, I will briefly
interpret Heidegger’s notion of authenticity itself more closely.
It is important to note that Heidegger avoided making explicit
value judgments and intended for his notion of authenticity
to be largely amoral. As such, it is difficult to reconcile
authenticity as being essential to a good life, a concept often
inherently associated with happiness, virtuosity, and other
value judgments. However, I aim to avoid this problem by
supposing authenticity as a prerequisite for completion, a
value-neutral concept. It is then merely the case that a life well
lived constitutes a life completed, in the sense of contentedness,
rather than moral-adjacent judgments such as a good or bad
life.
Authenticity is best explained in contrast to inauthenticity. To
be authentic, Dasein must avoid facticity. Facticity is the aspect
of inauthentic Dasein which suggests that what Dasein already
is, is an established fact. For example, if one is employed in a
certain career, then that is an established fact for them, marking
a sort of unalterable state. Dasein is thus inauthentic when it
is completely swallowed up and determined by das Man. To
become authentic entails taking responsibility for one’s own
existence and not falling into das Man. This requires adjusting
one’s comportment in correspondence to authenticity. This does
not necessarily mean changing careers (although it can), but
can mean changing how one comports oneself towards one’s
career. Authenticity entails seizing the roles one has in society
and making them one’s own in the Heideggerian sense of
Eigentlichkeit - owning oneself.
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Authentic aspirations then are the existential possibilities
that Dasein, through anxiety, identifies as being its ownmost.
Dasein needs to take a resolute stance towards its existential
possibilities and project itself into its ability-to-be. Calling
upon Heidegger’s emphasis on doing, aspirations are then
fulfilled by engaging in activity. To illustrate my account of
authentic aspirations, take the example of a person who aspires
to become a painter. They want to paint for painting’s sake.
They do not want to paint simply because society tells them
painting is valuable, or will make them rich (these can be
secondary motivations, but should not be the primary reasons
for the aspiration). The painter encountered art in the vast
array of existential possibilities and identified this, through
anxiety as noted in section IV, as one of their ownmost authentic
aspirations. This aspiration is then fulfilled by doing and
taking responsibility for their actions. They need to actively
and physically handle the paint and the brush. They can only
fulfill their aspiration to be a painter by picking up the tools
and engaging in the actions of a painter. By seizing upon
this particular possibility that they have found and engaged
within their Befindlichkeit, they can achieve fulfillment and
move towards completion. Completion is thus marked by
a fulfillment of aspirations and peace with the prospect of
death. However, fulfilling all of one’s aspirations can be near
impossible. For completion, one only needs to fulfill a sufficient
amount of existentially possible aspirations, meaning that they
fulfill those aspirations most important and most accessible to
them. Other aspirations must be distanced from. If you aspire
to become a painter, but you are severely allergic to all forms
of paint, you must distance yourself from this aspiration and
identify an existentially possible aspiration to fulfill instead this may be a different form of artistry, or a different kind of
aspiration altogether.
It is also not the case that one must only work towards their
authentic aspirations. Oftentimes, engaging in other aspirations
and obligations is necessary to function within society. What
matters is that alongside these extrinsic actions, one acts
towards the fulfillment of their own aspirations. Otherwise,
Dasein will simply become stuck in das Man. This is reflected
in how we often characterize working a dead-end job simply
to survive as an unfulfilling existence. The need to make
money and stay afloat in society is rarely part of our authentic
aspirations. Regardless, this is necessary for us to survive in the
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current state of our society, but it does not ultimately determine
completion and will thus not ensure we feel we have lived our
lives well. By focusing too much on the necessary means we
need to survive, we fall deeper into das Man and cloud our
perception of our own aspirations. The painter might never
be able to fully fulfill his aspiration to paint if he becomes
stuck in the notion that he needs to make money to survive
and focuses solely on this by, for example, taking an office job.
However, the painter might feel a lot more comfortable in this
office job making enough money to survive even if it means
not fulfilling their own aspirations. As Heidegger points out,
das Man is comforting, and functioning in it and with it is
necessary for our survival, but remaining solely in das Man will
not diminish our anxiety towards death. The painter will still
feel a much more unsettling existential anxiety in the office job,
preventing him from finding peace with the prospect of death.
Thus, our need to survive in das Man and our need to fulfill our
own aspirations need to be balanced. However, our anxieties
towards the former will seem almost frivolous in the face of
death, and thus ultimately will not matter nearly as much for
our ability to feel peace with the prospect of death.
In order to attain a life completed, one thus needs to (a)
disclose, take responsibility for, and act towards one’s ownmost
authentic aspirations, and (b) distance oneself and let go of
all other and not existentially possible aspirations. When this
is done, a lack of unfulfilled aspirations is what evokes the
feeling of peace with the prospect of death and marks a life well
lived. It will not seem like death has come too soon, or too late.
Instead, the person who experienced a life well lived is in a
sense ready to face death.
VI. Completion
I have unpacked the relevant parts of Heidegger’s ontology and
its implications, and have given my account of aspirations. I
will now give a brief overview of my account of the necessary
conditions for completion and my account completion
itself. What constitutes completion will be different for each
individual, as each person’s life is made their own through
the terms of their Befindlichkeit as outlined in section III.
However, we can nonetheless outline a generalized path
towards completion. The necessary condition for completion
is that Dasein feels peace with the prospect of death. This is
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achieved by the sufficient fulfillment of aspirations. Dasein
finds itself as being-in-the-world, on the edge of falling into
Das Man (or alternatively, already having become lost in Das
Man). Regardless of its initial position, Dasein will find itself
surrounded by possibilities and will experience existential
anxiety. It must project itself towards the existential possibilities,
and Dasein’s anxiety will reveal to it what it cares most about.
In revealing that which Dasein cares most about, its ownmost
aspirations will be disclosed as well, as these aspirations will be
rooted in that which Dasein cares about. Once these aspirations
are disclosed, Dasein can take a resolute stance towards them.
This resolution entails making authentic choices that seek to
fulfill Dasein’s aspirations. In fulfilling its ownmost aspirations,
Dasein will achieve a sense of completion, and anxiety will
dissipate. This completion of aspirations and absence of anxiety
will lead to a feeling of peace with the prospect of death. Once
Dasein is content and at peace with its own manifestation of
totality as death, Dasein is authentically being-towards-death.
Under Heidegger’s ontology, a practical characterization of a
life well lived can thus be summed up as a life completed, in
which death simply marks the totality of an ownmost authentic
existence, made up of the fulfillment of aspirations through
resolutely making sufficient authentic choices. When Dasein
feels a serene peace with the prospect of death, this is thus a
consequence that its ownmost aspirations have been fulfilled,
and its existence has reached totality - completion.
VII. Objections and Responses
One might object that a value-neutral conception of a life
well lived is inherently flawed, as within a society living
well also entails ethical conduct towards others and thus
being an ethically “good” person. This is also implied by
Heidegger’s statement that Dasein’s ownmost potentiality is
also determined in its being-with with others (175). To this I
respond that my account does not rule out that one should also
strive to be a moral person in regards to other’s potentialityfor-being. As such, the conditions I outline for a life completed
are necessary, rather than sufficient. Someone may fulfill all
of their aspirations for their own potentiality-for-being, but
still feel anxiety towards death, due to moral faults they made
throughout their life. In fact, Heidegger’s ontology similarly
implies that we have certain ethical obligations in respecting
other’s potentiality-for-being, but outlining these is outside of
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the scope of this paper.
Another plausible objection is that aspirations may be volatile,
or someone may have bad aspirations. To the latter, a similar
response can once again be given that Heidegger’s ontology
implies that we should respect others’ potentiality-for-being. To
the former, aspirations are to an extent contingent, in that they
depend on the environment in which one finds themselves.
Dasein’s aspirations will always be dependent on the available
existential possibilities and the way that Dasein is socialized. I
also account for the fact that someone can lose the notion that
their life is complete by uncovering a new possibility, and thus
the prospect of life ending too late rears its head, and anxiety
returns. Regardless, by virtue of being ownmost to Dasein,
authentic aspirations will not be volatile to the point that they
change so often that they inhibit Dasein from finding sufficient
fulfillment. Dasein need not fulfill every single aspiration it ever
had and ever will have, but simply enough to attain peace with
the prospect of death, and thus a sense of completion.
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